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UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE ANNOTATIONS
ARTICLE 9: SECURED TRANSACTIONS; SALES OF ACCOUNTS,
CONTRACT RIGHTS AND CHATTEL PAPER
SECTION 9-102. Policy and Scope of Article.
(1) Except as otherwise provided in Section 9-103 on multiple state
transactions and in Section 9-104 on excluded transactions, this Article
applies so far as concerns any personal property and fixtures within the
jurisdiction of this state
(a) to any transaction (regardless of its form) which is intended
to create a security interest in personal property or fixtures
including goods, documents, instruments, general intangibles,
chattel paper, accounts or contract rights. . . .
United States v. Sommerville, 211 F. Supp. 843 (W.D. Pa. 1962).
Flickinger obtained several loans over a four year period from the
Farmers Home Administration (FHA) which were secured by all of
Flickinger's farm equipment, crops and livestock. The security agree-
ment was properly filed as a financing statement under the Code. Flick-
inger delivered three cows to defendant, a cattle auctioneer, to be
sold at auction. Auctioneers, such as defendant, retained possession of
cattle received for sale only long enough to sell them.
Defendant, not knowing of the security interest of FHA, auctioned
the Flickinger cattel to the highest bidders for a total of $377.49. Upon
learning of this sale, FHA urged Flickinger to conduct a liquidation
sale of all his property, which he did, leaving a remaining indebtedness
to FHA of over $500. Plaintiff, on behalf of FHA, brought an action in
conversion against defendant for the value of the three cows.
The court decided that the agreement and conduct of both parties,
referring to and complying with the Code, under Section 9-102, indi-
cated that the local law applied. It then found the defendant liable
for the proceeds from the conversion, basing its decision solely on Penn-
sylvania agency law. As to defendant's argument that FHA did not act
in good faith because it did not furnish a list of debtor farmers, the
court held that since the security agreement was filed in accordance with
Section 9-401, and even though the Code does not expressly confer
constructive notice upon sellers, defendant could have easily consulted
the public records periodically to keep informed of the security interests
in chattels with which he may deal.
[Annotator's Comment: This case is squarely in line with Erb v.
Stoner, 19 Pa. D. & C.2d. 25, 56 Lanc. L. R. 434 (1959) (2 B.C. Ind.
& Com. L. Rev. 112, 114 (1960)). Although the results of these two
cases are identical, the reasoning used to reach these results raise some
interesting questions. In the Erb case, the auctioneer had knowledge that
the cows were subject to creditor's security interest, and the court put
emphasis on this fact. But in the instant case, the auctioneer did not
have knowledge of creditor's security interest, yet the court held him
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to something akin to constructive knowledge because the security agree-
ment was duly filed pursuant to Section 9-401. By so doing, the court
is applying and expanding Section 9-301. Section 9-301(1) provides that
a perfected security interest has priority over the interest of a subse-
quent lien creditor, bulk transferee, or buyer not in ordinary course of
business. An auctioneer found to be the agent of the debtor is not one
of these parties.
The court, however, discusses the filing as "constructive notice,"
not as an act of perfection. Filing is not required to perfect certain
security interests, such as purchase money security interests in consumer
goods, and there would be no "constructive notice" in such cases. Quaere
whether the . court would reach the same result by applying Sec-
tion 9-301(1) literally. Of course, on a strict agency theory, the auc-
tioneer, acting in behalf of the debtor, would be liable for unauthorized
disposition in the same way that the debtor would. The knowledge of
the debtor would be imputed to the agent. If the auctioneer were a
buyer for resale, he would be in no better position since, as a buyer of
farm products from a farmer, he does not qualify for the protection
afforded a buyer in ordinary course of business under Section 9-307(1)
and would have an interest subordinate to that of the secured party as
a buyer under Section 9-301(1).
Even in light of Section 9-104, which prescribes application of the
Code to a transaction governed by a federal law to the extent the federal
law does not apply, the court was correct in applying state law to this
transaction, for Section 21 of the Bankhead-Jones Farm Tenant Act,
60 Stat. 1071, 7 U.S.C. § 1007, makes no provision for this type trans-
action. The act was repealed in 1961 and replaced by 75 Stat. 307,
7 U.S.C. §§ 1921-90 (Supp. III 1962). The replacing statute also does
not provide for perfection and priorities in this type of transaction
leaving state law to control.]
SECTION 9-103. Accounts, Contract Rights, General Intangibles and
Equipment Relating to Another Jurisdiction; and
Incoming Goods Already Subject to a Security
Interest.
(3) If personal property other than that governed by subsections
(1) and (2) is already subject to a security interest when it is brought
into this state, the validity of the security interest in this state is to be
determined by the law (including the conflict of laws rules) of the jurisdic-
tion where the property was when the security interest attached. However,
if the parties to the transaction understood at the time that the security
interest attached that the property would be kept in this state and it was
brought into this state within 30 days after the security interest attached
for purposes other than transportation through this state, then the validity
of the security interest in this state is to be determined by the law of this
state. If the security interest was already perfected under the law of the
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jurisdiction where the property was when the security interest attached and
before being brought into this state, the security interest continues perfected
in this state for four months and also thereafter if within the four month
period it is perfected in this state. The security interest may also be perfected
in this state after the expiration of the four month period; in such case per-
fection dates from the time of perfection in this state. If the security interest
was not perfected under the law of the jurisdiction where the property was
when the security interest attached and before being brought into this state,
it may be perfected in this state; in such case perfection dates from the
time of perfection in this state.
(4) Notwithstanding subsections (2) and (3), if personal property is
covered by a certificate of title issued under a statute of this state or any
other jurisdiction which requires indication on a certificate of title of any
security interest in the property as a condition of perfection, then the per-
fection is governed by the Iaw of the jurisdiction which issued the certificate.
Commercial Credit Corp. v. Bangiorno, 45 Erie Leg. J. 92 (Pa. 1961).
Kreager executed a chattel mortgage on his automobile to the
plaintiff in Michigan. It was recorded on June 24, 1957. On September
11, 1957, Agostino, the agent of a Pennsylvania auto dealer, purchased
the car from Kreager and received a "discharge or placement of lien"
purportedly signed by the plaintiff's manager. The discharge contained
many blank spaces; only the name of the seller and the make of the
automobile were inserted. A procedure was set out for the securing of
an unencumbered certificate of title from the state of Michigan. A new
certificate was not obtained. Having transported the vehicle to Penn-
' sylvania, where a certificate of title was procured, the dealer sub-
sequently sold the vehicle. The plaintiff then brought an action in con-
version against the dealer averring that the release had been a forgery.
The defendant demurred, alleging that the laws of Pennsylvania, partic-
ularly Section 9-103, protect innocent purchasers of property subject to
foreign mortgages.
The court held that the rights of the parties must be determined
in accordance with Michigan law since the mortgage and sale were both
made there. Under that law, the purchasers did not take free of the
mortgage. The incomplete release should have aroused suspicion. An
effort to secure a new title certificate or to inquire at the plaintiff's
office would have disclosed the fraud. The demurrer was overruled and
the defendants allowed to file an answer.
[Annotator's Comment: It is significant to note that the defendant
in this case was not the ultimate buyer; had it been, the result might
have been different upon the grounds urged by the defendant.
Section 9-103(4) provides that perfection of the security interest
is governed by the law of the jurisdiction issuing a certificate of title
covering the vehicle. This case illustrates the potential difficulty which
may arise where two jurisdictions issue certificates of title covering the
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same motor vehicle. The court was correct in applying Michigan law
since the defendant's status as a good faith purchaser arose, if at all,
in that state where the vehicle was purchased. Were the Code effective
in Michigan at that time, the result would have been the same since,
if the security interest were perfected, good faith purchasers would take
subject to it under Section 9-301(1). The defendant dealer in this
case was not a buyer in ordinary course of business.
Even had the court applied the Code under Pennsylvania law and
assuming the security interest was not perfected within four months of
removal under Section 9-103(3), the facts were such that defendant's
good faith would be in question, requiring the overruling of the
demurrer.]
Skinner v. Tober Foreign Motors, Inc., — Mass. —, 187 N.E.2d 699
(1963).
See the Annotation to Section 2-209, supra.
n
SECTION 9-301. Persons Who Take Priority Over Unperfected
Security Interests; "Lien Creditor".
(1) Except as otherwise provided in subsection (2), an unperfected
security interest is subordinate to the rights of
(a) persons entitled to priority under Section 9-312;
(b) a person who becomes a lien creditor without knowledge of
the security interest and before it is perfected;
(c) in the case of goods, instruments, documents, and chattel
paper, a person who is not a secured party and who is, a
transferee in bulk or other buyer not in ordinary course of
business to the extent that he gives value and receives delivery
of the collateral without knowledge of the security interest
and before it is perfected;
(2) If the secured party files with respect to a purchase money security
interest before or within ten days after the collateral comes into possession
of the debtor, he takes priority over the rights of a transferee in bulk or of
a lien creditor which arise between the time the security interest attaches
and the time of filing.
(3) A "lien creditor" means a creditor who has acquired a lien on the
property involved by attachment, levy or the like and includes an assignee
for benefit of creditors from the time of assignment, and a trustee in bank-
ruptcy from the date of the filing of the petition or a receiver in equity
from the time of appointment. Unless all the creditors represented had
knowledge of the security interest such a representative of creditors is a
lien creditor without knowledge even though he personally has knowledge
of the security interest.
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United States v. Sommerville, 211 F. Supp. 843 (W.D. Pa. 1962).
See the Annotation to Section 9-102, supra.
SECTION 9-306. "Proceeds"; Secured Party's Rights on Disposition
of Collateral.
(4) In the event of insolvency proceedings instituted by or against
a debtor, a secured party with a perfected security interest in proceeds
has a perfected security interest
(a) in identifiable non-cash proceeds;
(b) in identifiable cash proceeds in the form of money which is
not commingled with other money or deposited in a bank
account prior to the insolvency proceedings;
(c) in identifiable cash proceeds in the form of checks and the
like which are not deposited in a bank account prior to the
insolvency proceedings; and
(d) in all cash and bank accounts of the debtor, if other cash
proceeds have been commingled or deposited in a bank
account, but the perfected security interest under this para-
graph (d) is
(i) subject to any right of set-off; and
(ii) limited to an amount not greater than the amount of
any cash proceeds received by the debtor within ten
days before the institution of the insolvency proceedings
and commingled or deposited in a bank account prior to
the insolvency proccedings less the amount of cash
proceeds received by the debtor and paid over to the
secured party during the ten day period.
Middle Atl. Credit Corp. v. First Pa. Banking & Trust Co., — Pa.
Super. —, 185 A.2d 818 (1962).
In August 1959, Middle Atlantic and Zucker executed a security
agreement whereby Middle Atlantic would purchase the accounts receiv-
able of Zucker. The security interest was properly perfected by filing.
Zucker was to turn over the proceeds from the accounts in the form in
which they were received. In January 1961, Zucker assigned to Middle
Atlantic a sum to become due under a construction contract. On Feb-
ruary 16, 1961, he received a check under that contract, but deposited
it in his own account with defendant bank. Four days later, Zucker
filed a petition under Chapter XI of the Bankruptcy Act. The bank
appropriated the balance of the deposit of February 16 in set-off against
an outstanding loan made to Zucker in 1960. Middle Atlantic brought
an action against the bank to recover the sum appropriated. The lower
court denied plaintiff's motion for judgment on the pleadings. On
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appeal, reversed, with judgment on the pleadings entered for plaintiff.
Under established Pennsylvania case law, the bank could not set
off funds of a third party in the debtor's account. Section 9-306(4) (d),
as amended in 1959 to conform to the 1958 Code, did not create any
new right of set-off, but allowed any existing right. Had the legislature
intended to create a new right under this section, it would have been
more clearly indicated.
[Annotator's Comment: Apparently Zucker had no other funds in
the account when the deposit was made. Therefore, the assignee had a
perfected security interest in and could recover the entire remaining sum
either as identifiable proceeds or as commingled proceeds received
within ten days of insolvency proceedings. Had there been other funds
in the account, the claim could have been only upon the latter basis.
The court correctly construed the provision relating to the bank's
right of set-off. Prior Pennsylvania law had established that the bank's
notice of the third party's interest was not required to deny the right
of set-off. In jurisdictions where notice is required, the court may
properly find that the filed financing statement constitutes such notice.]
SECTION 9-307. Protection of Buyers of Goods.
(1) A buyer in ordinary course of business (subsection (9) of Sec-
tion 1-201) other than a person buying farm products from a person
engaged in farming operations takes free of a security interest created
by his seller even though the security interest is perfected and even though
the buyer knows of its existence.
(2) In the case consumer goods and in the case of farm equipment
having an original purchase price not in excess of $2500 (other than
fixtures, see Section 9-313), a buyer takes free of a security interest
even though perfected if he buys without knowledge of the security interest,
for value and for his own personal, family or household purposes or his
own farming operations unless prior to the purchase the secured party
has filed a financing statement covering such goods.
United States v. Sommerville, 211 F. Supp. 843 (W.D. Pa. 1962).
See the Annotation to Section 9-102, supra.
SECTION 9-401. Place of Filing; Erroneous Filing; Removal of Col-
lateral.
(1) The proper place to file in order to perfect a security interest is
as follows:
Optional paragraph (a)
(a) when the collateral is equipment used in farming operations,
or farm products, or accounts, contract rights or general
intangibles arising from or relating to the sale of farm products
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by a farmer, or consumer goods, then in the office of the
  in the county of the debtor's residence or if the
debtor is not a resident of this state then in the office of the
	
 in the county where the goods are kept, and in addi-
tion when the collateral in crops in the office of the 	
in the county where the land on which the crops are growing
or to be grown is located;
United States v. Sommerville, 211 F. Supp. 843 (W.D. Pa. 1962).
See the annotation to Section 9-102, supra.
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